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Abstract 
For much of the twentieth century electricity
generation and transmission in New Zealand
was dominated by centralized state ownership
and control, with local authority ownership of
distribution and retailing. Radical reform of the
sector commenced in the early 1980s, with the
progressive corporatisation and unbundling of
these sub-sectors, limited privatizations, and a
shift towards “light-handed” non-industry
specific regulation. These reforms contained
inherent tensions that quickly manifested
themselves in a political stand-off over the
electricity price path required to support new
generation investment. In turn this standoff
spurred the industry-led development of a
voluntary, self-governing wholesale electricity
market. With a change of government in 1999
increasing re-centralization of industry
governance and regulation resulted, in part
justified on the grounds of winter power “crises”
in 2001 and 2003 involving significant wholesale
electricity price spikes (although blackouts were
a regular and more disruptive occurrence prior
to the reforms). With the return to centralized
industry governance and shift towards heavy-
handed regulation – but now with greater private
sector investment in the sector – system supply
and security issues persist, and questions
remain over the likely effect of these policy
reversals on required new investment. 
Note: This paper draws on Evans, L. and
Meade, R.: Contemporary Electricity Reform in
New Zealand, New Zealand Institute for the
Study of Competition and Regulation Inc,
www.iscr.org.nz, forthcoming.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Profile of New Zealand
New Zealand is a South Pacific country
comprising two main islands (South and
North), with a population of around 4
million and a land area approximately 85%
of that of Great Britain and Ireland
combined. Its nearest neighbour, Australia,
is some 2,500 km to the west. It is a stable
liberal democracy, being a constitutional
monarchy with a single legislative body and
a member of the British Commonwealth.
Since 1996 it has elected governments
under a mixed member proportional
representation (MMP) voting system, which
replaced the previous first-past-the-post
(FPP) system. The population is
predominantly European in origin, with the
indigenous Maori people comprising
around 15% of the population.
1.2. Reform context
By 1984 the New Zealand economy was
heavily protected, regulated and taxed.
Major economic sectors, notably
agriculture, were heavily subsidised, and
government was involved in a wide range
of commercial activities including electricity
generation and transmission, financial
services, telecommunications and
transportation. Such taxpayer investments
showed little financial return and also
suffered poor levels of service delivery.
In 1984 a reform- and market-minded
Labour government came to power and
quickly embarked on a radical programme
of economic restructuring and liberalization
aimed at improving the nation’s economic
efficiency. Markets were deregulated,
subsidies eliminated and tariffs phased out.
State-owned trading enterprises – including
electricity generation and transmission –
were corporatised and subjected to
increased commercial disciplines while
given greater operational autonomy, and in
many cases were privatized. Industry-
specific regulation was replaced by a
common competition policy with “light-
handed” regulation backed by the threat of
direct regulation where warranted.
Statutory monopolies in a variety of sectors
were removed. Many economic sectors,
such as electricity retailing and distribution,
were similarly subjected to significant
changes after years of relative stability.
For much of the past 20 years the broad
thrust of these reforms has been
maintained, although less so with time, in
part due to the 1996 shift from the FPP to
MMP voting system. With the election of a
coalition government dominated by a “third
way” Labour party in late 1999, and again
in 2002, there has increasingly been
reversals of a number of the earlier
reforms, notably in the governance and
control of the electricity sector.
1.3. Paper organization
Section 2 profiles the current New
Zealand electricity system. Section 3
provides further detail on the reform of the
electricity sector, highlighting the history of
changes in industry governance and
control. Section 4 discusses more recent
industry governance reform directions and
their motivations. Section 5 identifies
ongoing supply security and investment
issues in the light of these recent reforms.
Section 6 discusses and concludes.
2. NEW ZEALAND ELECTRICITY
SYSTEM
While oil satisfies around half of all New
Zealand’s energy demand (almost all of
which is transport-related), electricity
accounts for a quarter of energy demand.
Total electricity consumption was 33,000
GWh in 2002, with 44% of that consumed
by industry (one third of that by a single
aluminium smelter), 35% by residential
consumers, and the remaining 21% by
commercial users. 
Generation is predominantly hydro-
based (61% of 2002 output), followed by
gas (25%), geothermal (7%), and other
sources such as co-generation and wind-
turbines (7%). Four generators – three of
which are state-owned (62% of total
capacity) – meet 93% of electricity
demand. Due to geographical isolation, no
electricity can be imported or exported.
While 58% of the country’s 8,305 MW of
2002 generation capacity is in the North
Island, the main hydro catchments are
predominantly in the south of the South
Island. Demand is concentrated in the
North Island, particularly around the
country’s largest city, Auckland. This,
combined with New Zealand’s topography,
means that the 17,500 km of national
transmission grid is long, skinny and
sparse, with the country’s two main islands
interconnected by a 1,040 MW, 575 km
HVDC link, 40 km of which is submarine. 
With hydro storage capacity being only
12% of annual demand, hydro inflows into
the main catchments being volatile (-30%/
+35%), and winter-peaking demand, the
system has long been vulnerable to winter
supply shortages, most recently in 1992,
2001 and 2003. The supply situation is
tightening further relative to ever-growing
demand due to the run-down of the
country’s major gas field, Maui, and current
lack of significant alternative gas sources.
Around 80% of wholesale electricity is
traded through a centralized wholesale
electricity market (WEM), with the balance
traded bilaterally. Electricity is retailed via
vertically integrated generator/retailers,
while local distribution is undertaken by 28
electricity line businesses, most of which
are community- or customer-trust owned.
Residential and industrial electricity prices
– despite significant price rebalancing
since the reforms – remain at the lowest
end of OECD comparisons. Since 1 March
2004 the electricity sector is governed by a
newly-formed and government-controlled
body, the Electricity Commission (EC).
Figure 1 depicts New Zealand’s current
electricity system.
3. ELECTRICITY REFORM HISTORY
From the mid-1880s industrial concerns
and local communities were early
developers of electricity infrastructure in
New Zealand. Funding and coordinating
the large-scale development of
hydroelectric power schemes quickly
became a national priority, however, and
bringing together geographically separate
generation and demand through a
nationwide transmission grid resulted in
central government ownership and control
of generation and transmission. Local body
ownership and control of distribution and
energy retailing remained for much of the
twentieth century in the form of 61 
Figure 1. Schematic of the New Zealand
electricity system (adapted from Ministry of
Economic Development (2003))
Electricity Supply Authorities (ESAs) having
monopoly service rights and obligations in
local franchise areas. 
As of 1984 the responsibility for
generation and transmission lay with the
Electricity Division of the Ministry of
Energy, with control of these sectors
ultimately centralized under a government
minister. Wholesale electricity prices were
set and announced by the minister at the
annual ESA industry conference, and while
they were intended to recover system
running and maintenance (but not capital)
costs, they were influenced by political
imperatives such as controlling price
inflation. Erratic price changes, distorted
price signals to electricity consumers, and
mis-timed generation investments resulted.
In 1985 the Secretary to the Treasury
reported on New Zealand’s experience with
centralized generation planning and
production costs (Galvin (1985)). Prevailing
arrangements had failed to deliver
electricity at least practicable cost – the
objective of the day. Over-investment
arose due to systematic and gross over-
estimates of demand growth, and
investment projects suffered from
commissioning delays, large cost over-runs
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and electricity production costs well in
excess of those predicted. Given the
significant share of the nation’s assets
represented by generation and
transmission, it is therefore unsurprising
that the new 1984 government soon set its
sights on electricity reform.
The first major electricity reform initiative
was to transfer the generation and
transmission operations of the Ministry to a
newly-created, profit-driven State-Owned
Enterprise (SOE). Electricity Corporation of
New Zealand (ECNZ), was thus
established on 1 April 1987 under the SOE
Act 1986, while at the same time the
state’s statutory monopoly on generation
was removed. Transmission was ring-
fenced as a subsidiary of ECNZ,
Transpower New Zealand, in 1988, albeit
transmission and wholesale energy
charges remained bundled until 1993.
The SOE Act model contained inherent
tensions. While it created a degree of
operational autonomy for state-owned
commercial activities, political incentives
for ministers to involve themselves in
sensitive decisions (such as electricity price
changes) and to impose non-commercial
objectives remained. The model’s
proponents regarded it as a transitional
measure pending privatization, and that
delays in putting such companies beyond
political reach would inevitably result in an
erosion of SOEs’ autonomy and primarily-
commercial focus.
In 1989 a government-established task
force recommended the separation of
generation and transmission, the
privatization of ENCZ (without break-up),
and corporatisation and privatization of
distribution/retailing. Transpower was
formally established as a stand-alone SOE
in 1994, and government continued to
examine the potential for generation to be
broken up despite ECNZ objections.
The first major test of these initiatives
came in the form of a show-down over
electricity pricing in 1991 (see Martin
(1998)). Following four years of real
wholesale electricity price reductions and
falls in excess capacity, ECNZ announced
its intention to raise prices to signal the
cost of (and to fund) required new
generation investment. The Corporation
faced both ESA revolt and direct
government opposition to the move, and
rather than see its independence directly
compromised by political direction, it
adopted a price rise lower than announced.
Added to this show-down was a political
retreat from the general policy of
privatizations, meaning ECNZ faced
increasing risk of being returned to a
government department model of
governance and control. To avoid such
retrenchment it sought to foster greater
competition in generation (a political hedge
against break-up), and key to this was the
development of a WEM to replace the
centralized annual haggling between ECNZ
and the ESAs, and also to distance
electricity prices from political influence.
With government support an industry
study group comprising ECNZ,
Transpower, the ESAs and four major
electricity users was formed to examine the
need for a WEM. In 1992 it recommended
the development of a facilitated electricity
market comprising an independent grid,
wholesale pool and contract market. This
was in preference to pro-competitive
regulation, traditional regulation (e.g.
supply obligations and price- or return-
regulation) and public supply. A
government-sponsored follow-up study in
1994 echoed those recommendations –
with a voluntary wholesale market, and
Transpower providing non-discrminatory
grid access – but also sought constraints
on ECNZ’s generation dominance.
Meanwhile ECNZ, Transpower, the ESAs
and consumer groups sponsored the
creation of a joint venture company (M-Co)
to design and implement a WEM, later
called the NZEM,1 and in 1994 also agreed
arrangements for bilateral energy trading
(MARIA).2
The culmination of these initiatives was
the establishment of a trial secondary
market for ECNZ hedge contracts in 1994,
and a fully-operational voluntary and
industry self-governing WEM in October
1996. Full operations coincided with the
spin-out of 28% of ECNZ’s generation
capacity into a new SOE (privatized in
1999), Contact Energy, that was to
compete with ECNZ. At the same time
government confirmed its reliance on
competition (as opposed to regulation or
1
 New Zealand Electricity Market.
2
 Metering and Reconciliation Information
Agreement.
other intervention) to achieve efficiencies
and consumer benefits in electricity, gas
and telecommunications services. ECNZ
was subsequently separated into a further
three competing generators – Meridian
Energy, Genesis Energy and Mighty River
Power – in 1999. Also in 1999 industry
introduced self-governance arrangements
for determining grid security standards
(MACQS),3 formerly the purview of
Transpower.
Throughout this period reforms also
progressed at the retailing and distribution
level, first with corporatisaton in 1993 to set
such activities on a commercial footing,
and also with the phased abolition of
supply obligations and franchise
monopolies concluding in 1994. Mergers
and efficiency gains soon followed, but
major reform in the sector came with the
government-imposed ownership separation
of distribution from competitive activities
such as generation and retailing in 1999.
With restrictions on vertical integration by
generators into retailing lifted at the same
time, the newly-formed competing
generators quickly acquired retail
Figure 2. Electricity Reform Timeline
(courtesy of Transpower)
operations to form “gentailers”.
Until March of 2004 these arrangements
largely persisted, with the history of
electricity sector reforms illustrated in
Figure 2.
3
 Multilateral Agreement on Common
Quality Standards.
4. MORE RECENT REFORMS 
Until 1999 central government direction
of the industry continued to a degree, but
generally involving decentralization of
industry control to state-owned yet semi-
autonomous bodies. Industry-led initiatives
– notably the creation of the voluntary and
self-governing NZEM – were both a
reflection of, and attempt to enhance and
secure, industry’s growing capacity for self-
determination and responsibility for
meeting government’s overall industry
objectives.
This transition was not without its
tensions. The imposed separation of
distribution from other competitive activities
under 1998 legislation was a significant
example of political impatience with a
perceived slowness in the development of
retail-level competition. Transpower found
itself unable to implement pricing policy
changes in the face of distribution
company 
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opposition, and faced difficulties in
maintaining and developing the grid. And
the self-governing and industry-created
NZEM soon found itself being asked by
government to include a government policy
statement in its governing rules. Yet
industry generally responded to any
government requirements for change, and
its newfound autonomy (however
imperfect) was not overtly under threat.
With a change of government in late
1999, however, it was possible to discern
echoes of the changes quickly
implemented by its 1984 predecessor,
albeit in the reverse direction. In June 2000
an inquiry into the electricity industry
reported on whether whether existing
regulatory arrangements met the
government’s objective of ensuring that
“electricity is delivered in an efficient,
reliable and environmentally sustainable
manner.” Without establishing its case, the
inquiry recommended that industry’s self-
regulating governance arrangements –
NZEM, MARIA and MACQS – ought to be
consolidated under a single self-governing
body (an Electricity Governance Board,
EGB, later the EC) independent of industry,
and with that body’s reach being extended
to cover transmission and distribution
pricing. It further recommended a
departure from the previous 13 years of
“light-handed” regulation in favour of
incentive (i.e. CPI–X) regulation.
Industry was invited to consolidate its
industry governance arrangements as
recommended, under threat of imposed
changes should industry agreement not be
forthcoming. In the event agreement could
not be reached, notably with state-owned
Transpower favouring an imposed
regulatory alternative to the EGB.
Consequently industry governance was
reined in under a new regulatory body, the
EC – once again under the control of a
government minister – from 1 March 2004.
Adding impetus to the 2000 inquiry
recommendations was a winter power
supply crisis in 2001 (and supply scare in
2003) which government interpreted as a
sign of industry and market failure. Winter
electricity shortages due to volatile hydro
inflows and limited hydro storage were not
uncommon prior to the reforms, and
remain a risk even with recent government
moves to contract for reserve “dry-year”
generation capacity. Prior to the reforms,
however, such shortages inevitably
involved enforced blackouts, whereas
since the reforms they have instead been
reflected in soaring wholesale electricity
prices (from which retail prices have
remained largely insulated) and voluntary
savings campaigns. Whether or not these
winter shortages could be blamed on
industry rather than hydrology remains
moot, particularly since post-reform
environmental laws constrain new
generation investments that might relieve
shortages whereas pre-reform investments
in over-capacity did not avert shortages
and enjoyed both statutory endorsement
and taxpayer subsidy. However,
government took the recent shortages to
be added justification for reversing the
electricity governance reforms of the
preceding 15 years.
5. ONGOING SUPPLY SECURITY AND
INVESTMENT ISSUES
Accompanying the creation of the EC is
a raft of new regulation-making powers as
well as fundamental shifts in industry
control. The NZEM has been subsumed by
the EC. Transmission pricing and
investment has passed from centralized
determination by semi-autonomous
Transpower to centralized determination by
the EC under the ultimate control of a
government minister (leaving Transpower
as grid owner and system operator). Even
competitive electricity retail prices (i.e. not
just monopoly transmission or distribution
prices) have now been regulated. And
while current legislative amendments will
reduce the extent to which the EC is
beholden to its minister, it will remain less
autonomous than other regulatory bodies
(e.g. the Commerce Commission) and is
soon to receive considerably greater
regulatory scope. Notable among its
forthcoming powers will be an ability to
regulate significant operational discretions
of both state- and privately-owned
generators, such as hydro spill, fuel
reserves and levels of supply contracting.
Such moves beg the question as to
whether a return to the centralized control
model of before the reforms will better
ensure low electricity prices and limit
supply shortages (or better manage their
impact)? Certainly government has made
itself squarely responsible for future
industry performance and any failings. This
was all-too-apparent when a risk of
transmission outages in parts of the South
Island materialised in the winter of 2004.
Since transmission capacity has been the
responsibility of centralized and state-
owned Transpower throughout the reform
period it cannot be said that such risks are
a reflection of market failure (although it
has been suggested that a loss of
coordination between centralized
generation and centralized transmission is
to blame). While both Transpower and the
EC denied responsibility for the outage
risk, it was clear that the responsible
minister was now squarely accountable for
the outcome.
While the recent centralization of
industry control under government has the
potential to overcome any coordination
problems hampering efficient new
investment in generation and transmission,
it is neither necessary (as the PJM
experience in the US would suggest)4 nor
without its own pitfalls. Post-reform
environmental laws continue to constrain
investment in both areas, and the EC does
not resolve this. Besides, other challenges
remain with new ones also arising.
An infrastructure audit commissioned by
government (PricewaterhouseCoopers
(2004)) reported that the key issue facing
generation is whether investment will be
sufficient to meet the country’s ongoing
electricity needs. Among other things, it
prominently identifies the impact of the EC,
and particularly the uncertainties now
created by its wide-ranging regulatory
powers and how they may or may not be
applied, as a key factor in stalling solutions
to supply security issues. And this despite
the EC being charged with securing
electricity supply. Additionally, generators
are delaying investment pending resolution
of transmission pricing issues and
allocation methodologies for new
transmission investment costs.
Unsurprisingly these issues remained
unresolved while industry faced years of
governance uncertainty created initially by
4
 Electrical interconnection area
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Virginia and the District of Columbia
the June 2000 inquiry recommendations
and then by the subsequent centralization
of industry governance under the new EC.
Since the EC is yet to resolve these issues
such key uncertainties must remain, which
will materially undermine its supply security
responsibilities. The new solution is now a
key part of the problem.
While uncertainties regarding the EC’s
operations and effect might be expected to
subside with time, two more fundamental
uncertainties now confront long-term
investments in generation and
transmission. The first stems from the
return to explicit politicisation of electricity
governance. Since industry governance
now ultimately resides with a government
minister, industry governance can now
change with a change of government. This
creates a material increase in investment
risk for private investors seeking to invest
in New Zealand, as future investment
returns are more exposed to adverse policy
shifts.
The more fundamental uncertainty now
confronting electricity investment in New
Zealand, however, is reform uncertainty.
Since the mid-1980s industry reform
progressed in the main towards greater
reliance on market solutions and a steady
level of decentralized industry governance.
Recent reforms reverse this trend and
raise the spectre of future reform about-
turns – in either direction – within the
lifetime of new long-lived investments.
Since investors will respond to the
incentives politicians place before them, it
should be expected that future electricity
investments will now be determined less on
their economic benefits and more on the
ability of their sponsors to manage now-
increased political risks. To the extent
investors are unable to adequately manage
those risks they will simply defer or
suspend new investment and/or seek
better or more certain returns in other
jurisdictions. Once again the New Zealand
taxpayer may find itself the only party
willing and able to underwrite new
electricity investment in New Zealand while
other countries continue to successfully
encourage private investors to provide the
necessary capital and bear the long-tailed
risks.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
New Zealand’s electricity reforms are
not remarkable for having commenced
against a backdrop of centralized
government ownership and control of
generation and transmission. Nor is it
remarkable for now having instituted a
centralized government agency
responsible for regulating industry’s
performance and progress. They are,
however, remarkable in at least three
respects.
First is that New Zealand’s early
decentralization of industry governance –
albeit incomplete and always contingent on
satisfactory industry evolution – was
sufficient to spur very significant industry-
led reforms. The creation of a voluntary,
self-governing centralized WEM remains a
significant and distinctive achievement. So
too are the MARIA and MACQS
agreements which, together with the
NZEM, constituted industry self-
governance until their assumption by the
new EC. They are testament to the ability
of industry to constructively respond to
government’s desired reform objectives,
even if its perceived slowness and
unavoidable exposure to climate-driven
winter supply shortages ultimately provided
government the justification it needed to
reassert control of the process.
Second is the fact that the newly
centralized industry governance now arises
with greater private investment in the
sector, but only a fraction of that now
enjoyed in other reforming jurisdictions.
New Zealand now has an electricity sector
that is both regulated and predominantly
either government- (generation, retailing
and transmission) or locally-owned
(distribution). To the extent that
government or local ownership provides a
natural hedge against monopoly abuses by
grid or lines operators, or market power
abuses by oligopolistic generators, the
addition of heavy-handed regulation is
arguably disproportionate. Certainly the
recently-introduced CPI–X regulation of
transmission and distribution, and now
price regulation of retailing, affects the
incentives for new investments in each of
these sectors. With the possible
introduction of operational-level and other
regulations by the new EC this is only more
so. It also arises in the absence of the
significant sales proceeds on offer from
privatisation – which proceeds other
reforming jurisdictions have secured
without sacrificing consumer gains,
employment or investment.
Finally, New Zealand’s more recent
reforms are notable for their inconsistency
with ongoing reforms in other jurisdictions.
As mentioned above, while the fact of a
reformed but regulated sector is
unremarkable, it is remarkable that New
Zealand’s response to real or perceived
industry failings has been to revert to
essentially the same centralized
governance model as that existing at the
beginning of the process. Electricity reform
has shown itself to be an incremental
process, with earlier mistakes or mis-steps
subsequently remedied. However,
subsequent reform measures have
typically built on earlier moves towards
private sector involvement and increased
use of decentralized market mechanisms.
The introduction of NETA5 in England and
Wales is a notable example. New Zealand,
for its part, appears to be abandoning
reliance on decentralized market solutions
in favour of a more centralized
administrative model. In so doing, and
given the deferral of needed investments in
the sector in the face of increased
investment risks associated with the new
EC, it risks replacing evolutionary re-reform
with counter-productive “de-reform”.
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